Changes in the Design of Simultaneous Elections after Constitutional Court Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024: Implications for Constitutional Democracy and the Law-Making Authority

Abstract

This study aims to analyse the redesign of simultaneous elections after Constitutional Court Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024 and its implications for constitutional democracy and the law-making authority in Indonesia. The issue is important because the decision changes the electoral simultaneity model by separating national elections from local elections, thereby affecting democratic representation, electoral management, legislative discretion, and the institutional role of the Constitutional Court. This study uses a qualitative legal research method with a normative-juridical approach. The analysis applies statutory, case, and conceptual approaches by examining the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, election laws, regional election laws, Constitutional Court decisions, and recent scholarly literature on electoral design, constitutional democracy, judicial review, and legislative authority. The findings show that Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024 represents a constitutional reorientation of electoral simultaneity from a single-day five-ballot model into a differentiated electoral architecture. The separation of national and local elections may strengthen democratic participation, reduce electoral complexity, improve the visibility of local issues, and support more meaningful representation. Yet the decision also narrows legislative discretion and creates transitional challenges regarding electoral scheduling, office terms, legal certainty, and institutional readiness. This study contributes by framing the decision as constitutional electoral engineering that must be followed by transparent, participatory, and accountable legislative reform.